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1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Folk has asked this Court to overturn his conviction for sexual abuse of a minor
because the State secured that conviction after resorting to tactics which subverted the rules of
evidence, turned a blind eye to its ethical duties, and violated Mr. Folk’s constitutional rights.
Rather than confronting these issues head-on, the State has responded by oversimplifying and
trivializing Mr. Folk’s arguments, glossing over the parts of the record which don’t suit its
position, and relying on the same faulty logic that plagued the trial.  This reply addresses a
handful  of  the  State’s  arguments  in  Issues  III  and  VI,  as  well  as  the  implications  of  a  recent
Idaho Supreme Court decision on Issue II.
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ISSUES
I. Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because the district court
erroneously admitted Blaine Blair’s white-washed, irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial
testimony regarding Mr. Folk’s alleged desire to sexually abuse children, and that error
surely contributed to the verdict?
II.  Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because the district court
erroneously admitted irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, confusing, and misleading evidence
of the alleged oral-to-genital contact, and that error surely contributed to the verdict?
III.   Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because the district court
erroneously excluded T.R.’s prior sworn testimony when T.R. repeatedly testified that he
did not remember that testimony, and the State cannot prove that error did not contribute
to the verdict?
IV. Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because the district court
erroneously admitted Detective Galbreaith’s hearsay testimony that T.R. had told him
that Mr. Folk had put his mouth on T.R.’s penis, and the State cannot prove that error did
not contribute to the verdict?
V.   Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because the district court
erroneously denied his Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal after the State
introduced no evidence that Mr. Folk tickled T.R. or touched T.R.’s hips with the intent
to gratify his sexual desires?
VI.   Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because the prosecutor
committed misconduct amounting to fundamental error when, in closing, he asked the
jury to draw an inference which he knew to be false, told the jury that Mr. Folk “didn’t
want  to  be  cross-examined,”  and  said  “the  victim of  this  crime didn’t  get  that  luxury,”
even though “he’s not the one who’s alleged to have done something wrong”?
VII.  Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because, even if these errors
are individually harmless, the accumulation of the errors deprived Mr. Folk of his




This Court Should Vacate Mr. Folk’s Conviction Because The District Court Erroneously
Admitted Irrelevant, Unfairly Prejudicial, Confusing, And Misleading Evidence Of The Alleged
Oral-To-Genital Contact, And That Error Surely Contributed To The Verdict
In addition to the authority Mr. Folk cited in his appellant’s brief to support his argument
that evidence of the oral-to-genital contact was not admissible as res gestae or  part  of  the
complete story, the Idaho Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Kralovec, No. 44250, 2017
Opinion No. 3 (January 23, 2017) (not yet final), further supports his position.  There, the Court
“decline[d] to perpetuate the use of the res gestae doctrine in Idaho,” and held “that evidence
previously considered admissible as res gestae is only admissible if it meets the criteria
established by the Idaho Rules of Evidence.” Id. at 6–7.  Although the Court discussed res
gestae in the context of hearsay, its decision to disavow the principle of res gestae generally
supports Mr. Folk’s argument that the evidence was not admissible because it was not relevant
and was not necessary to give the jury the complete story.   (App. Br., pp.33–36.)
III.
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Folk’s Judgment Of Conviction Because The District Court
Erroneously Excluded T.R.’s Prior Sworn Testimony After T.R. Repeatedly Testified That He
Did Not Remember That Testimony, And The State Cannot Prove The Error Did Not Contribute
To The Verdict
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Folk argued that the district court erred by not allowing
Mr. Folk to introduce extrinsic evidence of T.R.’s prior sworn testimony when T.R. stated, over
and over again, that he did not remember issues to which he had previously testified.  (App.
Br., pp.39–43.)  In response, the State first takes issue with Mr. Folk’s citation to “vast swaths”
of  the  transcript.   (Resp.  Br.,  p.18.)   Mr.  Folk  regrets  that  it  is  necessary  to  cite  to  such  large
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portions of the transcript, but again directs the Court to the district court’s repeated instructions
that Mr. Folk could only introduce extrinsic evidence if T.R. denied making a statement, not if he
simply did not remember it.  (See App. Br., pp.39–40 (citing Tr. Vol. I, p.451, L.25–p.452, L.5
(“[H]e’s being asked if this would refresh his recollection.  Generally he’s been saying
sometimes that it does, sometimes that it doesn’t.  And that’s different than impeaching with
prior inconsistent testimony.  And not remembering isn’t necessarily inconsistent.”), p.467,
Ls.21–25 (“If he says he doesn’t remember, that’s not the same as denying it.  If he looked at it
and said, yeah, I may have said that in the first trial but I don’t remember now, then you’ve made
your point and you have to go on.”), p.486, Ls.12–14 (“If he denies it, then you can submit
extrinsic evidence.  If he doesn’t deny it, then you’ve made your point and you get to move
on.”), p.505, Ls.5–7 (“If he denies that he made the statement, then extrinsic evidence is
admissible.  If he doesn’t deny it, then impeachment is complete.”), p.507, Ls.3–5 (“[I]f he
denies it, confront him with it.  If he still denies it, I’ll let extrinsic evidence in.  If he doesn’t
deny it, then you’ve made your point.”)).)
The district court made those statements as Mr. Folk struggled through cross-examination
with numerous objections by the prosecutor.  Mr. Folk acknowledges that many of these
exchanges are so muddled that it is difficult to determine exactly what extrinsic evidence
Mr. Folk would have introduced had the court not incorrectly instructed him that he could only
introduce extrinsic evidence if T.R. flat-out denied making a statement.  But that is precisely the
point—“[t]he error in this case so pervaded T.R.’s testimony that it is impossible to say how T.R.
would have testified, or what information the jury would have been able to consider, had the
district court ruled correctly.”  (App. Br., p.42.)  Perhaps the most concise example of the error,
however, is when Mr. Archibald requested that the court publish all of the transcripts of T.R.’s
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prior testimony because T.R. did not remember anything, and the court again explained that
Mr. Folk could not admit the extrinsic evidence unless T.R. denied making the statement, not
simply if he could not remember.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.504, L.21– p.505, L.7.)
In response to Mr. Folk’s argument that T.R.’s prior sworn testimony was admissible
non-hearsay under I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A), the State claims that the argument was not preserved
because “the district court never ruled on a hearsay objection.”  (Resp. Br., p.17.)  It goes on to
cite legal authority for the proposition that “‘[o]bjecting to the admission of evidence on one
basis  does  not  preserve  a  separate  and  different  basis  for  exclusion  of  the  evidence.’”   (Resp.
Br., p.18 (quoting State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880 (Ct. App. 2000).)  But Mr. Folk was the
party attempting to introduce the testimony, not exclude it.  Therefore, Mr. Folk had no burden to
“object” on hearsay grounds; his only burden was to make the substance of the evidence known
to the court and lay the proper foundation, which he did. See App. Br., pp.41–42 (citing
Preuss v. Thomson, 112 Idaho 169, 171 (Ct. App. 1986)); I.R.E. 103(a)(2) (“Error may not be
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party
is affected, and . . .  In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions
were asked.”).  Instead, it was the State’s burden to object to the evidence that Mr. Folk wanted
to admit.
Further, this issue is properly before the Court because the district court appears to have
believed that an outright denial was necessary for extrinsic evidence to be admissible either for
impeachment or substantive purposes. See State v. Duvalt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) (stating
that  “ordinarily  issues  cannot  be  raised  for  the  first  time  on  appeal,”  unless  the  issue  was
“decided by the trial court”).  When Mr. Archibald suggested that “maybe we should just publish
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. . . the transcript of his previous testimony since the witness doesn’t remember anything,” the
Court said,
 there’s no need to publish it if he doesn’t deny it.  I think the mode of
impeachment is you just ask him about it.  Right? Certainly, though, if it’s under
oath, it could be extrinsic evidence, if he’s denying it.  But I don’t think he’s
denying it.  If he denies that he made the statement, then extrinsic evidence is
admissible.  If he doesn’t deny it, then impeachment is complete.
And I’m basically just quoting Rule 613.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.504, L.25–p.505, L.7 (emphasis added).)  Mr. Folk’s argument under I.R.E.
801(d)(1)(A) is preserved for review.
Regarding I.R.E. 613, the State first misstates Mr. Folk’s argument by asserting that the
district court correctly concluded that T.R.’s prior testimony would not be admissible if T.R.
admitted to making the statement.  (Resp. Br., pp.19–21.)  To be clear, Mr. Folk never argued
that the district court erred by excluding T.R.’s prior testimony when he admitted to making a
given statement; he challenged only the court’s exclusion of T.R’s testimony when T.R. said that
he did not remember whether he made the statement.  (See, e.g., App. Br., p.42 (“T.R. repeatedly
said he did not remember making the statements contained in his testimony from the previous
trials and preliminary hearings.  And despite Mr. Folk’s attempt to admit extrinsic evidence of
that testimony, the court repeatedly instructed him that he could only do so if T.R. denied
making the statements, not if T.R. merely could not remember.”) (citations omitted).)
The State next recognizes that prior testimony is generally admissible under I.R.E. 613
when a witness denies having made the statement, but appears to rely on State v. Koch,
157 Idaho 89 (2014), for the proposition that a district court nevertheless has the discretion to
exclude such evidence (Resp. Br., p.22 (“it is also true that ‘trial judges must retain a high degree
of discretion in deciding the exact point at which a prior statement is sufficiently inconsistent
with a witness’s trial testimony to permit its use in evidence’”) (quoting Koch, 157 Idaho at
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104).) Koch, however, is inopposite. Koch did not deal with a witness’s inability to remember
an issue to which he testified previously, and did not hold that a district court has the discretion
to determine that an inability to remember an issue is consistent with prior testimony about that
issue. Koch, 157 Idaho at 104.  Instead, it only held that, where there are two statements on the
same subject matter that are not unequivocally inconsistent, the district court has the discretion to
determine whether they are sufficiently inconsistent to admit the extrinsic evidence. Id.
(explaining that the witness’s “testimony denying a close relationship and declaring Koch’s
innocence can reasonably be inferred to have arisen from a belief inconsistent with the belief that
gave rise to [the witness’s] prior statement articulating suspicions as to something going on
between [the victim] and Koch.”).
Finally, the State argues in a footnote that “[b]ecause the district court excluded extrinsic
evidence of statements only where the witness admitted making the statement, any error was also
harmless.”  (Resp. Br., p.21 n.5.)  Again, that argument does not address the issue actually raised
by Mr. Folk.  (See supra, pp.6–7; App. Br., pp.39–43.)  Therefore, the State has failed to meet its
burden of proving that the error actually asserted by Mr. Folk was harmless, and the error
requires remand. See State v. Hill, No. 44011, 2016 WL 6892562, at *5 (Idaho Nov. 23, 2016);
State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598–99 (2013); State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010).
VI.
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Folk’s Judgment Of Conviction Because The Prosecutor
Committed Misconduct Amounting To Fundamental Error When He Asked The Jury To Draw
An Inference Which He Knew To Be False, Told The Jury That Mr. Folk “Didn’t Want To Be
Cross-Examined,” And Said “The Victim Of This Crime Didn’t Get That Luxury,” Even Though
“He’s Not The One Who’s Alleged To Have Done Something Wrong”
Mr. Folk argued in his appellant’s brief that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
asking the jury to draw an inference the prosecutor knew to be false, by implicating Mr. Folk’s
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constitutional rights to remain silent and confront the witnesses against him, and by suggesting
that the jury convict on an improper basis.  (App. Br., pp.49–55.)  In response, the State first
argues that the prosecutor did not ask the jury to draw an inference the prosecutor knew to be
false when it commented on Mr. Folk’s failure to cross-examine Mr. Blair about Mr. Folk’s
alleged desire to sexually abuse children.  (Resp. Br., pp.28–32.)  The State suggests that one
statement could have taken place before the alleged crime and the other could have taken place
after,  in  such  a  way  that  they  are  not  inconsistent.   (Resp.  Br.,  pp.30–31.)   The  State’s  novel
interpretation of the facts is possible, but unlikely, and is irrelevant either way.
First,  Mr.  Folk  and  Mr.  Archibald  repeatedly  rested  their  arguments  on  the  belief  that
Mr. Blair’s assertion in the interview was a prior inconsistent statement of his trial testimony
(R., pp.369, 607; 8/3/15 Tr., p.68, Ls.2–11), yet the prosecutor never gave the explanation that
the State has given for the first time on appeal (R.646; 6/8/15 Tr., p.17, Ls.8–20).  Even when
Mr. Folk asked the prosecutor to clarify the timing of these statements, he did not do so:
DEFENDANT FOLK: I’ve looked at the original statement in Detective
Galbreaith’s interview.  And I specifically—I can’t say for certain if that’s the
incident that the State is basing this statement on.  And I would like that clarified
for the record, if that is in fact the case.  Or just this prior testimony alleging that
there was a conversation that took place other than that.
THE COURT:  So you want to know if it’s from the interview or from the
testimony?
DEFENDANT FOLK:  That the subject matter is based on the interview
or the testimony.
THE COURT:  Okay.  Okay.  Like I saw, I reviewed the transcripts over
the weekend.  I know it did come in, in the testimony.
Mr. Dewey?
MR. DEWEY:  Your honor, the subject matter relates to a conversation
that the defendant had with Blaine Blair.  I mean I think that that’s as clear as it
needs to be. With regard to whether he’s made statements on the same issue or
different issues in the past, that’s an impeachment issue.
. . . .
DEFENDANT FOLK: . . . And the other thing is if we go in on Detective
Galbreaith’s  interview,  Blain  Blair  says  that  the  defendant  said  that  he  wasn’t
going to have contact with children anymore.  And I have to be able to impeach
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him with this to say that he told Detective Galbreaith the exact opposite.  And I’m
not sure—
THE COURT:  We’ll they’re not asking him about his interview with
Detective Galbreaith.  They’re asking him about his visit with the witness,
Mr. Blaine [sic].  If you want to bring in the fact that there was a prior
inconsistent statement or something made to Galbreaith, that’s going to be up to
you, and that’s your call. . . .
. . . .
DEFENDANT FOLK:  Yes, sir.  But I would be using that statement to—
when Blaine Blair says that there was a conversation of sexual abuse, that I would
be able to impeach him and say that his actual original statement was that there
was no intention to have sexual contact.
THE COURT:  That’s a strategic decision you’re going to have to make.
Certainly I will allow you to bring that up if you want to open that door.  I’m not
going to let the State open that door.  But if you want to do that, you can do that.
MR.  ARCHIBALD:   And that’s  been  part  of  my concern  as  his  standby
counsel is how do you cross-examine and how do you lay foundation for the
context of this statement without bringing in the 404(b) evidence.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.23, L.8–p.27, L.4.)  Counsel is unaware of any place in the record where Mr. Blair
states at what time Mr. Folk told him that he did not want to stop abusing children, though the
parties represented early on in the case that it was before the alleged crime.  (4/15/15 Tr., p.59,
Ls.8–12.)
Second, although the record does not unequivocally state when Mr. Folk told Mr. Blair
that he was going to quit having contact with children, the most reasonable inference is not that
Mr. Folk made that statement after the alleged crime.  In response to Detective Galbreaith’s
question of when Mr. Folk told Mr. Blair that he was going to quit having contact with children,
Mr. Blair responded “he told me that several times.”  (Mot. Aug., p.4 (Police Interviews, p.7,
Ls.14–19).)  Mr. Blair’s answer to that particular question—when Mr.  Folk  made  the
statement—indicates that, on several separate occasions, Mr. Folk indicated he was going to quit
having contact with children.  It  does not,  as the State seems to suggest,  indicate that Mr. Folk
made that statement several times during one conversation after the alleged crime.  This is
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especially true because Mr. Blair said that Mr. Folk did not tell him about the alleged crime.
(Mot. Aug., p.3 (Police Interviews, p.2, Ls.22–24).)
Regardless of the actual timing of these statements or the State’s newfound justification
for the prosecutor’s actions, the record shows that the prosecutor believed that Mr. Folk could
have used the interview with Detective Galbreaith to impeach Mr. Blair, but also knew that
Mr. Folk could not do so without bringing in his prior offenses.  (R., pp.369, 646, 607; 6/8/15
Tr., p.17, Ls.8–20; 8/3/15 Tr., p.68, Ls.2–11.)  Therefore, the prosecutor committed misconduct
by implying that Mr. Folk must not have had any evidence or argument to rebut Mr. Blair’s
testimony about Mr. Folk’s alleged desire to sexually abuse children.
The State next argues that the prosecutor permissibly commented on Mr. Folk’s failure to
testify because Mr. Folk discussed his reasons for not doing so during his closing argument.
(Resp. Br., pp.34–35.)  The State cites to no legal authority that actually supports its proposition.
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and State v. Dougherty, 142 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2005), on
which the State relies, address only post-Miranda silence, not silence at trial. Doyle held that
“the use for impeachment purposes of [a defendant’s] silence, at the time of arrest and after
receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause,” but noted that “post-arrest
silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpatory
version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest.” Doyle,
426 U.S. at 619 & n.11.  Relying on Doyle, the Dougherty Court explained that, because
Dougherty had testified that no one interviewed him about the crime, the prosecutor had
permissibly called a detective to ask whether anyone had offered to take Dougherty’s statement
when he was arrested. See Dougherty, 142 Idaho at 4.  Neither case discussed a prosecutor’s
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decision to comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, and his reason for doing so, in closing
argument. Doyle and Dougherty are thus inapplicable.
Finally,  the  State  claims  that  the  prosecutor  did  not  infringe  on  Mr.  Folk’s  right  to
confrontation or appeal to the emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury when he stated that
“[t]he victim of this crime didn’t get that luxury.  And he stood—he sat here and he was cross-
examined for hours about what had happened.  He’s not the one who’s alleged to have done
something  wrong.  .  .  .”   (Tr.  Vol.  II,  p.735,  Ls.5–11.)   The  State  asserts  that  these  statements
were “a response” to Mr. Folk’s closing argument, and that the prosecutor was simply
“comparing and contrasting” Mr. Folk’s closing argument with Mr. Folk’s cross-examination of
T.R.   (Resp. Br., p.36.)  With respect to the prosecutor’s statement that the cross-examination
lasted  for  hours,  the  State  asserts  that  this  was  “merely  .  .  .  [a]  factual  statement”  which  “the
jurors  witnessed  in  person.”   (Resp.  Br.,  p.36.)   These  arguments  are  credulous.   The  State  in
essence asks this Court to turn a blind eye to the only conceivable purpose of the prosecutor’s
statements—to fault Mr. Folk for exercising his right to confront T.R. and appeal to the emotion,
passion, and prejudice of the jury.  This Court should reject the State’s attempt to explain away
what is unequivocally misconduct amounting to fundamental error.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, as well as those articulated in the appellant’s brief, Mr. Folk
respectfully requests that this Court vacated his judgment of conviction and remand this case to
the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 30th day of January, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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